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455 
COURT-PACKING AND THE CHILD LABOR 
AMENDMENT 
Gerard N. Magliocca* 
No amendment which any powerful economic interests or the 
leaders of any powerful political party have had reason to 
oppose has ever been ratified within anything like a reasonable 
time. And thirteen states which contain only five percent of the 
voting population can block ratification even though the thirty-
five States with ninety-five percent of the population are in 
favor of it.1 
  Franklin D. Roosevelt 
We cannot take a stand consistently against the pending 
proposal to pack the United States Supreme Court and at the 
same time against the orderly amendment to the Federal 
Constitution that is proposed by this amendment.2 
  Abbot Moffett, New York Assemblyman 
 
On March 9, 1937, President Franklin D. Roosevelt 
delivered a much-anticipated radio address to the nation 
defending his proposal to “reorganize” the Supreme Court.3 In 
that speech, FDR argued that the repeated invalidation of New 
 
 *  Professor of Law, Indiana University—Indianapolis. Many thanks to Dan Cole, 
Heidi Kitrosser, Mike Pitts, Richard Primus, the staff at the Franklin D. Roosevelt 
Library in Hyde Park, NY, and the faculty at DePaul Law School for their assistance and 
comments on prior versions of this Article. 
 1. Franklin D. Roosevelt, A ‘Fireside Chat’ Discussing the Plan for Reorganization 
of the Judiciary, in 6 THE PUBLIC PAPERS AND ADDRESSES OF FRANKLIN D. 
ROOSEVELT 122, 131 (Samuel I. Rosenman ed., 1941) [hereinafter Fireside Chat]. 
 2. W.A. Warn, Child Labor Bill Dies in Assembly; Vote Is 102 to 42, N.Y. TIMES, 
Mar. 10, 1937, at 20 (describing the debate on the Child Labor Amendment to the 
Federal Constitution by the New York Assembly). 
 3. For more on this Fireside Chat, see 2 BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE: 
TRANSFORMATIONS 326–27 (1998); JOSEPH ALSOP & TURNER CATLEDGE, THE 168 
DAYS 112–13 (1938); BURT SOLOMON, FDR V. THE CONSTITUTION: THE COURT-
PACKING FIGHT AND THE TRIUMPH OF DEMOCRACY 136–38 (2009); Turner Catledge, 
Roosevelt Asks that Nation Trust Him in Court Move; Resents ‘Packing’ Charges, N.Y. 
TIMES, Mar. 10, 1937, at 1. The audio of the President’s address can be found at 
http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/mediaplay.php?id=15381&admin=32.  
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Deal statutes by the Justices meant that “we must take action to 
save the Constitution from the Court and the Court from itself.”4 
According to the President, this crisis could not be resolved by a 
new constitutional amendment, in part because of the “long 
course of ratification by three-fourths of all the States” required 
by Article Five.5 The only solution was to “infuse new blood” 
into the Court by adding many new Justices right away.6 
Just a few hours before FDR went on the airwaves, the New 
York State Assembly rejected the Federal Child Labor 
Amendment (CLA), which was passed by Congress in 1924 but 
languished in the States during the 1920s and 1930s.7 By 1937, 
however, half the States had ratified the CLA and its supporters 
were optimistic about getting more to do so because they had 
 
 4. Fireside Chat, supra note 1, at 126; see Morehead v. New York ex rel. Tipaldo, 
298 U.S. 587, 609–10 (1936) (holding that the New York minimum wage law violated due 
process); United States v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1, 68–72 (1936) (striking down the 
Agricultural Adjustment Act for exceeding Congress’s authority under the Commerce 
Clause); Railroad Retirement Bd. v. Alton R. Co., 295 U.S. 330, 367–68 (1935) (striking 
down the Railroad Retirement Act for going beyond Congress’s power under the 
Commerce Clause); Fireside Chat, supra note 1, at 125–26 (criticizing these decisions); see 
generally JEFF SHESOL, SUPREME POWER: FRANKLIN ROOSEVELT VS. THE SUPREME 
COURT (2010) (providing an excellent account of what led to the Court-packing crisis).  
 5. Fireside Chat, supra note 1, at 131; see U.S. CONST. art. V (setting forth the 
requirement that an amendment must be ratified by three-fourths of the States). FDR 
also said that agreeing on the text of an amendment and garnering the two-thirds vote 
necessary in each House of Congress would be too difficult. See id.  
 6. The President’s proposal would have created an extra seat on the Court for 
every Justice over the age of seventy, and there were six Justices above that age at the 
time. See BARRY FRIEDMAN, THE WILL OF THE PEOPLE: HOW PUBLIC OPINION HAS 
INFLUENCED THE SUPREME COURT AND SHAPED THE MEANING OF THE 
CONSTITUTION 3 (2009); WILLIAM E. LEUCHTENBURG, THE SUPREME COURT REBORN: 
THE CONSTITUTIONAL REVOLUTION IN THE AGE OF ROOSEVELT 134 (1995). 
 7. See Warn, supra note 2, at 1 (discussing the vote); see also DAVID E. KYVIG, 
EXPLICIT AND AUTHENTIC ACTS: AMENDING THE U.S. CONSTITUTION 1776-1995, at 
258–61 (1996) (describing the CLA’s failure to get traction); WALTER I. TRATTNER, 
CRUSADE FOR THE CHILDREN: A HISTORY OF THE NATIONAL CHILD LABOR 
COMMITTEE AND CHILD LABOR REFORM IN AMERICA 169–99 (1970) (discussing the 
ratification fight from 1924 through the mid-1930s); Julie Novkov, Historicizing the 
Figure of the Child in Legal Discourse: The Battle Over the Regulation of Child Labor, 44 
AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 369, 394–403 (2000) (providing more background); Richard B. 
Sherman, The Rejection of the Child Labor Amendment, 45 MID-AMERICA 3 (1963) 
(“The collapse of the ratification drive revealed a far deeper distrust of the federal 
government and its efficacy as an instrument of reform than supporters of the 
amendment had anticipated.”). 
The CLA would have empowered Congress to limit, regulate, or prohibit the labor 
of people under eighteen. See Coleman v. Miller, 307 U.S. 433, 436 n.1 (1939) (“Section 
1. The Congress shall have power to limit, regulate, and prohibit the labor of persons 
under eighteen years of age. Sec. 2. The power of the several States is unimpaired by this 
article except that the operation of State laws shall be suspended to the extent necessary 
to give effect to legislation enacted by the Congress.”). The Fair Labor Standards Act 
accomplished the same goal in 1938. See Sherman, supra, at 14; see also United States v. 
Darby, 312 U.S. 100, 115 (1941) (upholding the FLSA).  
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the backing of a powerful patron—the President.8 Two months 
prior to the New York vote, FDR wrote a letter to the governors 
of the states that had not ratified the CLA and urged them to 
make that one of their top priorities.9 He also waded into the 
New York debate by sending public telegrams on behalf of the 
Amendment, though his lobbying was obviously unsuccessful.10 
Thus, on March 10, readers of The New York Times were 
greeted by a front-page with two banner headlines–one about 
FDR’s appeal for Court-packing and the other on the failure of 
the CLA in New York.11 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
This Article explores the connection between the Child 
Labor Amendment and FDR’s Court-packing plan. 
Conventional wisdom says that the long fight to ratify the CLA 
soured the President on the Article Five process and persuaded 
him that challenging the Justices was the better option.12 The 
truth is more complex. At the same time that the Administration 
was arguing that the deadlock over the CLA demonstrated that 
textual amendments were not a realistic way to achieve legal 
change, FDR was putting on a full-court press for the ratification 
 
 8. For a complete history of the CLA ratification struggle, see Coleman, 307 U.S. 
at 473 n.* (Butler, J., dissenting) (providing a chronology of state legislative action on the 
Amendment). 
 9. Roosevelt Pleads on Child Labor Act, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 9, 1937, at 5; see also 
Memorandum from Francis Perkins, Sec’y of Labor, to FDR (Dec. 28, 1936), at 1 (on file 
with the FDR Presidential Library) (proposing that this letter be sent) [hereinafter 
Perkins Memo].  
 10. Roosevelt Spurs Child Labor Foes, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 5, 1937, at 12 (providing 
the text of the telegram). 
 11. There is no evidence that the timing of these events was anything other than a 
coincidence, though it does nicely encapsulate the broader point of this Article. The 
Times headline is confusing in that it refers to the “Child Labor Bill” instead of the 
“Child Labor Amendment.” There is no doubt, though, about what that story was talking 
about. 
 12. See, e.g., LEUCHTENBURG, supra note 6, at 110 (“The President was especially 
influenced by the tiresomely long, unsuccessful saga of attempting to win ratification for 
the child-labor amendment, a struggle then in its thirteenth year.”). 
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of that amendment.13 More perplexing still, the President made it 
clear in his private letters during these weeks that he had no 
faith in the ratification process.14 This raises an obvious 
question—why did FDR put his authority behind the CLA? 
While there is no smoking gun that describes the President’s 
motives, the best explanation is that he supported the CLA 
because he thought that it would fail and that highlighting that 
failure would help the Court-packing plan. FDR’s foes in 
Congress saw through this double-game and tried to expose his 
real motives by backing a revised version of the CLA that would 
have required state ratification conventions to vote on the 
proposal within ninety days: an idea that would have undercut 
the rationale for Court-packing.15 All of these maneuvers came 
to an abrupt and inconclusive end, however, when the Justices 
executed their “switch-in-time” a month after the President’s 
address.16 Thus, the Child Labor Amendment ratification debate, 
which reached its climax at about the same time that the Court-
packing plan was proposed and the Justices flipped, sheds new 
light on that crucial series of events. 
The most important takeaway from my story is that the view 
that state ratification is a high hurdle for constitutional 
amendments is an interpretation of Article Five that only 
emerged in 1937. When Congress passed the CLA in 1924, the 
prevailing consensus was that state legislatures were nothing but 
 
 13. For a sample of the Administration’s views on why the CLA’s failure supported 
Court-packing, see President Roosevelt’s Plan for the Reorganization of the Federal 
Judiciary: Hearing Before the S. Judiciary Comm., 75th Cong. 14 (1937) (statement of 
Attorney General Cummings) (on file with the FDR Presidential Library) (“The 
phraseology of any proposed amendment would be the subject of endless debate and, 
once submitted, might suffer the fate of the child labor amendment which has been 
pending for thirteen years.”). The hearings on FDR’s Supreme Court proposal began one 
day after the events described at the start of the text.  
 14. See infra text accompanying notes 105–109. 
 15. See Mr. Vandenberg’s Amendment, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 30, 1937, at 22 (describing 
his proposal to reintroduce the CLA with modified language and require that it be voted 
on by state ratification conventions within ninety days) [hereinafter Vandenberg]; id. (“If 
Mr. VANDENBERG is correct in believing that Congress, in submitting an amendment 
to State conventions, has the right to set the time for the calling of such conventions—
and many constitutional authorities believe that it has—then he is justified in declaring 
that his amendment could be ‘ratified within ninety days’ if the full power of the 
Administration were put behind it.”).  
 16. See NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1, 48–49 (1937) (upholding 
the Wagner Act); West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379, 399–400 (1937) 
(upholding a Washington state minimum wage statute and overruling Adkins v. 
Children’s Hospital); ALSOP & CATLEDGE, supra note 3, at 144–47 (recounting the 
switch-in-time); SOLOMON, supra note 3, at 156–61, 179–82 (same).  
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a rubber stamp for amendments.17 By 1937, however, state 
legislatures were viewed as a major obstacle. In part, this was 
because of the difficulties that the CLA encountered in the 
States. In part, though, this transformation was the product of 
FDR’s deliberate effort to convince people, contrary to the 
historical record, that state ratification of amendments was hard. 
His argument on this point became an axiom in constitutional 
practice even though his attempt to pack the Court failed. 
Accordingly, we need to reconsider what the constitutional 
crisis of 1937 was all about. When lawyers and historians reflect 
on the Court-packing plan, they usually reach two conclusions. 
First, the failure of FDR’s proposal fixed the number of justices 
at nine for all time.18 Second, the Court learned that it could not 
stand in the way of determined public opinion and must not 
stray too far from the majority’s constitutional views.19 The CLA 
debate adds a third leg to this stool. In the first three months of 
1937, political elites and ordinary citizens were persuaded that 
state legislatures could not be relied upon to ratify major 
constitutional amendments. This presumption, which was 
reinforced by the defeat of the Equal Rights Amendment 
(ERA) during the 1970s, is now so strong that the difficulty of 
moving an Article Five amendment through the States is treated 
as a fact.20 
Part One explores how the Article Five process was viewed 
when the CLA was proposed and shows that most people 
 
 17. See 65 CONG. REC. 10,088 (1924) (statement of Sen. Reed) (“We know from 
experience that State legislatures have rarely in recent years ever paused even to debate 
a proposed constitutional amendment . . . . I do not mean to say that rule is universal, but 
I do affirm it to be general.”); infra text accompanying notes 47–56 (discussing the effort 
by CLA opponents to thwart the proposal by requiring that ratification be by 
conventions rather than by legislatures). 
 18. See, e.g., Stephen B. Burbank, The Architecture of Judicial Independence, 72 S. 
CAL. L. REV. 315, 322 (1999) (“The number nine is fixed in our brains not so much as a 
function of current legal awareness but as a number that has assumed the proportion of a 
constitutional understanding. This understanding emerged from a time of crisis, the crisis 
that President Roosevelt’s court-packing plan precipitated in 1937.”).  
 19. See FRIEDMAN, supra note 6, at 4 (“In effect, a tacit deal was reached: the 
American people would grant the justices their power, so long as the Supreme Court’s 
interpretation of the Constitution did not stray too far from what a majority of the 
people believed it should be. For the most part, this deal has stuck.”). 
 20. Of course, one could say that neither the CLA nor the ERA failed in the sense 
that their substance was eventually incorporated into statutory and case law, see David 
A. Strauss, The Irrelevance of Constitutional Amendments, 114 HARV. L. REV. 1457, 
1475–78 (2001) (making this point), but with respect to the ERA that is a debatable 
point. For a recent discussion about the relevance of the CLA’s failure for the debate 
over originalism, see John O. McGinnis & Michael B. Rappaport, Originalism and the 
Good Constitution, 98 GEO L.J. 1693, 1724–26 (2010).  
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thought that ratification by state legislatures was easy. Part Two 
examines why the CLA ran into a wall of opposition that 
undermined this assumption about the role of state legislatures. 
Part Three looks at how the close attention given to the CLA in 
the first three months of 1937 influenced the debate on Court-
packing and transformed the meaning of Article Five. 
I. THE GOLDEN AGE OF TEXTUAL AMENDMENTS 
This Part traces how the States treated proposed 
constitutional amendments until the passage of the CLA in 1924. 
The evidence is clear that state legislatures almost always 
ratified an amendment sent by Congress and did so quickly. 
After all, four were approved in the decade prior to the proposal 
on child labor.21 Indeed, the notion that state legislatures were an 
insignificant barrier within Article Five was so widely accepted 
that congressional enemies of the CLA made their stand by 
proposing that state conventions rather than legislatures be 
required to ratify the Amendment.22 
A. FROM THE BILL OF RIGHTS TO WOMEN’S SUFFRAGE 
A review of the historical record reveals that getting state 
legislatures to endorse a textual amendment was not a problem 
prior to 1924. In the midst of the Court-packing fight, a young 
Republican congressman with a bright future, Everett Dirksen, 
assembled data on this question to refute the President’s claim 
that the states could not ratify amendments within a reasonable 
time.23 Dirksen’s research showed that only one of the first 
 
 21. See, e.g., AKHIL REED AMAR, AMERICA’S CONSTITUTION: A BIOGRAPHY 405–
28 (2005) (describing the constitutional amendments on the income tax, the direct 
election of Senators, prohibition, and women’s suffrage). 
 22. See 65 CONG. REC. 7286 (1924) (stating the suggested change in the House of 
Representatives as: “This article shall be inoperative unless it shall have been ratified as 
an amendment to the Constitution by the conventions of the several States, as provided 
in the Constitution, within seven years from the date of the submission hereof by 
Congress”); id. at 10009 (making a similar proposal in the Senate that lacked the seven-
year time limit); cf. KYVIG, supra note 7, at 250 (“In the 1920s expressions of concern 
about Article V tended to come not from those who feared that amendment was too 
difficult but from those who worried that it was too easy.”). 
 23. See Time Factor in Amendments, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 21, 1937, at 54 [hereinafter 
Time Factor]. The first ten amendments (as a group) took 810 days to receive approval 
by three-fourths of the States, the Eleventh Amendment took 339 days, the Twelfth 
Amendment 229 days, the Thirteen 309 days, the Fourteenth 756 days, the Fifteenth 356 
days, the Sixteenth 1,278 days, the Seventeenth 359 days, the Eighteenth 396 days, the 
Nineteenth 444 days, the Twentieth 327 days, and the Twenty-First 286 days. Id. While 
there might be some minor errors in these figures, they are substantially correct and 
confirm the broad point about the speed of state ratification. 
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twenty-one amendments, the Sixteenth, took longer than three 
years to ratify.24 The Supreme Court made a similar point in 
Coleman v. Miller,25 which addressed the question of whether the 
ratification process for the CLA was justiciable, when it said that 
“one year, six months and thirteen days was the average time 
used in passing upon amendments which have been ratified since 
the first ten amendments . . . three years, six months and twenty-
five days has been the longest time used in ratifying.”26 
Not only were constitutional amendments prior to the 1920s 
adopted rapidly, but there were only four passed by Congress 
that were not ratified. Two were in the original proposal for the 
Bill of Rights. One involved limits on congressional pay raises 
and was eventually ratified—two hundred years later—as the 
Twenty-Seventh Amendment.27 The other sought to regulate the 
size of the House of Representatives and the number of 
constituents that a member could represent.28 This proposal 
came up one state shy of the total needed for ratification.29 Next 
came the Anti-Title Amendment, which was passed by Congress 
in 1810 and would have revoked the citizenship of anyone who 
accepted a title from a foreign power or, without the consent of 
Congress, a foreign gift.30 That also fell one state short.31 Finally, 
 
 24. Id. While the CLA was pending, the Twentieth and Twenty-First Amendments 
were ratified in less than a year. Id. The Twenty-First, though, was ratified by 
conventions. See infra text accompanying notes 88–91 (examining the logic behind this 
exception). 
 25. 307 U.S. 433 (1939). 
 26. Id. at 453; see also Dillon v. Gloss, 256 U.S. 368, 372 (1921) (stating that prior to 
the Eighteenth Amendment “seventeen of these [amendments] had been ratified by the 
Legislatures of three-fourths of the states—some within a single year after their proposal 
and all within four years”); ACKERMAN, supra note 3, at 261–65 (discussing Coleman). 
 27. See U.S. CONST. amend. XXVII (“No law, varying the compensation for the 
services of the Senators and Representatives, shall take effect, until an election of 
Representatives shall have intervened.”); Michael Stokes Paulsen, A General Theory of 
Article V: The Constitutional Lessons of the Twenty-Seventh Amendment, 103 YALE L.J. 
677, 678–81 (1993) (discussing that long-delayed ratification). 
 28. See 1 Stat. 97 (1789) (“After the first enumeration required by the first article of 
the Constitution, there shall be one Representative for every thirty thousand, until the 
number shall amount to one hundred, after which the proportion shall be so regulated by 
Congress, that there shall not be less than one hundred Representatives, nor less than 
one Representative for every forty thousand persons, until the number of 
Representatives shall amount to two hundred; after which the proportion shall be so 
regulated by Congress, that there shall not be less than two hundred Representatives, nor 
more than one Representative for every fifty thousand persons.”); AMAR, supra note 21, 
at 82 (discussing this proposal and noting that its goals were accomplished through 
legislation). 
 29. See AMAR, supra note 21, at 82. 
 30. See Res. 2, 11th Cong., 2d Sess., 2 Stat. 613 (1810) (“If any citizen of the United 
States shall accept, claim, receive or retain any title of nobility or honour, or shall, 
without the consent of Congress, accept and retain any present, pension, office or 
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there was the Corwin Amendment, which was passed by a lame-
duck Congress in 1861 as a last ditch effort to prevent secession 
by providing permanent protection to slavery.32 With the onset of 
the Civil War, that proposal never got off the ground.33 These 
scattered instances of state legislative resistance to textual 
amendments–all of which occurred long before the 1920s—do 
not weaken the claim that state ratification was considered easy 
before the passage of the CLA. 
In any event, this remote history was far less relevant for the 
Congress that proposed the CLA than the recent ratification of 
the Sixteenth, Seventeenth, Eighteenth, and Nineteenth 
Amendments in quick succession. Senator Henry Cabot Lodge, 
for example, told his colleagues that although he would vote for 
the CLA he was “not at all in favor of the practice we have fallen 
into of constantly amending the Constitution.”34 A House 
member echoed this sentiment and said that amendments were 
now “being proposed and falling as thick as ‘the autumn leaves 
which strew the vales in Vallombrosa.’”35 In this context, an 
argument that state legislatures constituted a bottleneck for 
Article Five would have been met with incredulity. 
B. CHILD LABOR AND THE CONVENTION POISON PILL 
The Child Labor Amendment was proposed because of the 
Supreme Court’s refusal to sanction ordinary legislative 
measures taken to abolish the practice.36 In 1916, Congress 
passed the Owen-Keating Act, which barred the interstate 
shipment of goods made by children under the age of fourteen 
 
emolument of any kind whatever, from any emperor, king, prince or foreign power, such 
person shall cease to be a citizen of the United States, and shall be incapable of holding 
any office of trust or profit under them, or either of them.”). 
 31. See KYVIG, supra note 7, at 117. 
 32. See J. Res. 13, 36th Cong., 2d Sess., 12 Stat. 251 (1861) (“No amendment shall 
be made to the Constitution which will authorize or give to Congress the power to 
abolish or interfere, within any State, with the domestic institutions thereof, including 
that of persons held to labor or service by the laws of said State.”). 
 33. See KYVIG, supra note 7, at 151 (noting that only three states ratified the 
Corwin Amendment); see also AMAR, supra note 21, at 457 n* (pointing out that Illinois 
ratified the amendment in an “irregular” manner). 
 34. 65 CONG. REC. 10,124 (1924) (statement of Sen. Lodge). 
 35. Id. at 7287 (statement of Rep. Garrett). 
 36. See Bailey v. Drexel Furniture Co. (Child Labor Tax Case), 259 U.S. 20, 36, 44 
(1922) (striking down a federal excise tax on the profits earned through child labor as 
violating the Tenth Amendment); Hammer v. Dagenhart, 247 U.S. 251, 276–77 (1918) 
(voiding a federal statute that barred the shipment in interstate commerce of goods made 
by child labor as exceeding Congress’s commerce clause power), overruled by United 
States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100, 116–17 (1941). 
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and those between fourteen and sixteen who worked more than 
eight hours a day or forty hours per week.37 A constitutional 
challenge reached the Court two years later in Hammer v. 
Dagenhart,38 where five Justices held that the Act was beyond 
Congress’s Commerce Clause authority because the goods 
themselves were harmless and the “production of articles, 
intended for interstate commerce, is a matter of local 
regulation.”39 The Court also held that “[t]here is no power 
vested in Congress to require the states to exercise their police 
power so as to prevent possible unfair competition” stemming 
from unequal labor laws.40 Justice Holmes dissented and argued 
that when states “seek to send their products across the State 
line they are no longer within their rights.”41 Besides, “if there is 
any matter upon which civilized countries have agreed—far 
more unanimously than they have with regard to intoxicants and 
some other matters over which this country is now emotionally 
aroused—it is the evil of premature and excessive child labor.”42 
Congress responded with the Child Labor Tax Law, which 
imposed a ten-percent excise tax on the profits earned on the 
same categories of goods that had been prohibited by the Owen-
Keating Act.43 The Court rejected this measure also, with Chief 
Justice Taft reasoning that the “analogy to the Dagenhart Case 
is clear” and that “[t]o give such magic to the word ‘tax’ would 
be to break down all constitutional limitation of the powers of 
Congress and completely wipe out the sovereignty of the 
states.”44 As a result, the only course open to critics of child labor 
was an Article Five amendment. It soon became clear that there 
was broad support for an amendment, just as there had been for 
the legislation attacking child labor.45 Even Calvin Coolidge, 
hardly a progressive, endorsed the CLA.46 
 
 37. See Hammer, 247 U.S. at 268 n.1 (quoting the Act); TRATTNER, supra note 7, at 
127–31 (describing the debate on the Act); Novkov, supra note 7, at 373 (summarizing 
the legislation). 
 38. 247 U.S. 251 (1918). 
 39. Id. at 272. 
 40. Id. at 273. 
 41. Id. at 281 (Holmes, J., dissenting). 
 42. Id. at 280 (Holmes, J., dissenting). 
 43. See Bailey, 259 U.S. at 34–35 (providing the text of the statute); TRATTNER, 
supra note 7, at 139–40 (describing the tax); Novkov, supra note 7, at 373 (same). 
 44. Bailey, 259 U.S. at 39, 38. 
 45. See TRATTNER, supra note 7, at 128 (stating that the Owen-Keating Act passed 
the House of Representatives by 343 to 46); id. at 131 (listing the Senate tally as 52 to 
12); id. at 140 (stating the Senate vote on the child labor tax was 50 to 12 and the House 
vote was 310 to 11). For more on the backdrop of the CLA in Congress, see Sherman, 
supra note 7, at 4–7. 
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Outnumbered foes of the Amendment tried to kill the 
proposal by introducing a requirement that ratification in the 
States be done by conventions and not by legislatures.47 The 
thrust of their argument was that legislatures did not provide any 
meaningful input into the deliberative process.48 As one 
Congressman explained: 
It is known to every student of American affairs that the 
consideration of constitutional amendments by the several 
legislatures has been in some if not many States almost 
perfunctory. There has been little or no discussion of the 
amendments by the several legislatures. There has been no 
argument against argument, no judgment against judgment, 
no real contest, and no real debate exciting interest or 
contributing information.49 
Likewise, the Senator who introduced a convention 
substitute there said the “facts show that the people elected to 
 
  I do not have a good explanation for why the CLA moved so easily through 
Congress but ran into a buzz saw in the States. One possibility is that opponents of the 
amendment did not get organized until the proposal reached the States. Congress could 
also have been out of synch with the sentiments of the country on this issue, though I am 
not sure why that would have been the case.  
 46. See Calvin Coolidge, Annual Message (Dec. 6, 1923), in 21 A COMPILATION OF 
THE MESSAGES AND PAPERS OF THE PRESIDENTS 1789-1925, at 9350 (James D. 
Richardson ed., 1925) (“For purposes of national uniformity we ought to provide, by 
constitutional amendment and appropriate legislation, for a limitation of child labor.”). 
 47. See U.S. CONST. art. V (stating that constitutional amendments may be ratified 
by state conventions or legislatures). There were substantive points made against the 
CLA, but those are considered in Part II. See infra text accompanying notes 63–86. 
 48. Another concern was that voters ought to have a more direct say in the 
ratification process. See 65 CONG. REC. 7287 (1924) (statement of Rep. Garrett) (“[A]s 
conditions of law stand today, less than 3,000 individuals in the United States can amend 
the organic law of the United States without there being in any way the slightest 
opportunity for the masses of the people themselves to pass upon . . . such an 
amendment.”) Some of this feeling stemmed from the ratification of the Eighteenth 
Amendment in Ohio, where a referendum rejected Prohibition and, under state 
constitutional law, nullified the legislative action. See KYVIG, supra note 7, at 242–43 
(describing this development). The Supreme Court held that this procedure was 
inconsistent with Article Five. See Hawke v. Smith, 253 U.S. 221, 227 (1920) (stating that 
the method of ratification was expressly limited and “admits of no doubt in its 
interpretation. It is not the function of courts or legislative bodies, national or state, to 
alter the method which the Constitution has fixed.”). This decision left the impression (at 
least for some people) that the ratification process was undemocratic. See KYVIG, supra 
note 7, at 246 (quoting H.L. Mencken’s view that “free people, asked to give up their 
ancient liberties, ought to have a fair chance to say yes or no, and not be rooked of them 
by a process suggesting that whereby a three-card monte man operates upon the 
husbandmen at a county fair”). 
 49. 65 CONG. REC. 7286 (1924) (statement of Rep. Montague); see id. at 10,074 
(statement of Sen. Overman) (“Suppose this amendment shall be submitted now, will the 
people have any voice in its ratification? No. It will be railroaded through the legislatures 
which will meet next January . . . .”). 
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the legislatures do not reflect the calm, considered judgment of 
the people of the States.”50 Another Senator held that a 
“member of a State legislature justifies himself in that attitude 
by saying that both branches of Congress have already approved 
the measure, and that he yields to their superior wisdom and 
judgment, and, therefore, he does not pause to investigate.”51 
Supporters of the CLA dismissed these objections as a 
transparent attempt to impede ratification.52 One Representative 
said that every “gentleman in this House, whether he is for or 
against this amendment, understands that the motive . . . at least 
the result to be accomplished by the adoption of the proposed 
amendment—would be to defeat any child labor law.”53 Others 
could not understand how legislative ratification, which had 
been used for every constitutional amendment up to that time, 
could be problematic.54 When the votes were cast, the 
convention alternative failed overwhelmingly.55 Both Houses 
 
 50. Id. at 10,009 (statement of Sen. Bayard). Some Senators also argued that many 
of the recent amendments were passed in haste and would not have been ratified if 
conventions were used. See id. at 10,074 (statement of Sen. Overman) (“I am pledged 
never again to vote for a constitutional amendment unless it shall be submitted to the 
people for their ratification. We all know the history of the adoption of the fourteenth, 
fifteenth, sixteenth, seventeenth, and eighteenth amendments. We know that in their 
ratification the people were not consulted; we know that that the voice of the people 
could not be heard . . . .”); id. at 10,009 (statement of Sen. Bayard) (“Had any one of 
these matters, from the thirteenth, fourteenth, and fifteenth amendment up, been sent to 
the several States for ratification by conventions, I question if the thirteenth, fourteenth, 
or fifteenth amendments would have been ratified. . . . I question very much whether the 
eighteenth and nineteenth would . . . .”). 
 51. Id. at 10,088 (statement of Sen. Reed). 
 52. Cf. KYVIG, supra note 7, at 267 (“More than a touch of irony could be found in 
evolving attitudes about constitutional amendment during the 1920s. Conservatives came 
to argue that an amendment’s validation required direct popular participation in its 
approval. Meanwhile, progressive reformers, usually the advocates of participatory 
democracy, grew leery of its application to the amendment process.”). 
 53. 65 CONG. REC. at 7286 (statement of Rep. Foster); see id. (“That must be the 
purpose and desire of any person, in my judgment, advocating the adoption of this 
amendment. Otherwise, why should we abandon the ratification by State legislatures and 
place it in the conventions?”); see also id. at 10,109 (statement of Sen. Walsh) (stating 
that the convention substitute was designed “to put another obstacle in the way of this 
reform which the Congress of the United States has twice indorsed and the House of 
Representatives has now three times indorsed, each time by an overwhelming vote”). 
 54. See id. at 10,010 (statement of Sen. Robinson) (“[I]f the convention plan is such 
a good one and so thoroughly calculated, as the Senator states, to reflect the popular will, 
and the legislature plan is such a bad one and so calculated to reflect the contrary of the 
popular will, why the people have never insisted upon having ratifications through 
conventions but have always acquiesced in ratifications through State legislatures.”). 
 55. See id. at 10,141 (stating that the vote was 22 to 58 in the Senate); id. at 7289 
(stating that the vote was 84 to 175 in the House). 
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then passed the CLA by more than the two-thirds necessary 
under Article Five.56 
The reason that this procedural debate is so fascinating is 
that less than fifteen years later the opposite argument was 
made. State legislatures became the bogeyman of constitutional 
reform and those trying to block the President’s Court-packing 
plan maintained that conventions were the best way to expedite 
ratification.57 The CLA’s rough ride through the States partly 
explains that turnaround. 
II. THE RATIFICATION DEBATE IN THE STATES 
This Part examines the arguments made against the CLA 
that stymied its ratification from 1924 until 1937.58 Critics of the 
proposed Amendment were particularly concerned about its 
effect on parochial schools, the threat posed to parental rights by 
subjecting childhood to federal authority, and the fear that 
expressly authorizing Congress to regulate labor would be the 
first step toward communism.59 While these charges stopped the 
CLA in its tracks, they did not change the view that legislatures 
were the best way of ratifying amendments. 
A. SUBSTANTIVE ATTACKS AND HYPERBOLE 
Though Arkansas ratified the CLA a few weeks after the 
congressional vote, only five more states did so over the next six 
years.60 Even worse for anti-child labor activists was that more 
than twenty legislatures rejected the proposal in the 1920s, which 
 
 56. See id. at 10,142 (listing the final tally as 61 to 23); id. at 7295 (listing the vote as 
297 to 69 in the House). 
 57. See infra text accompanying notes 133–141. 
 58. I will not dwell on the arguments in favor of banning child labor, as they are not 
that hard to understand today. See 65 CONG. REC. 7168 (1924) (statement of Rep. 
Nelson) (“The Constitution of America is the world’s greatest charter of human 
emancipation. It was written by American men to protect man’s right to life, liberty, and 
happiness; it is now also the instrument for the enfranchisement of American women; 
and it shall be the refuge of freedom for American children from every form of child 
slavery forever.”); KYVIG, supra note 7, at 165 (quoting Herbert Hoover’s endorsement 
of the CLA because child labor was “a blight . . . more deplorable than war”). 
 59. Cf. ROBERT H. JACKSON, THE STRUGGLE FOR JUDICIAL SUPREMACY 261 
(1941) (“In the effort to use language broad enough so that judicial construction could 
not again mutilate it, a sweeping authority to the Federal Government was proposed. Its 
breadth aroused the apprehensions of many people, some of whom had no sympathy 
with the Court’s disposition of the Child Labor cases. But because of these 
apprehensions it made slow progress towards ratification.”). 
 60. See KYVIG, supra note 7, at 261 (explaining that three states ratified the CLA 
between 1925 and 1930); Sherman, supra note 7, at 14 (noting that only Arkansas, 
Arizona, and California had ratified the CLA in January 1925). 
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meant that more than the one-quarter total that could veto an 
Article Five amendment was on record as saying no.61 This 
lopsided result was the product of a strange coalition that 
included the Catholic Church, white southerners, the textile 
industry, and farmers, who probably agreed on nothing other 
than their animus toward the CLA.62 
One leader of the campaign against ratification, especially 
in Massachusetts and New York, was the Catholic Church, which 
feared that the Amendment would let Congress regulate 
parochial schools.63 Catholics argued that education was 
implicated by the proposal since federal authority over “labor” 
could be read to cover the mental labor of students in the 
classroom.64 This was not an idle threat, as Oregon had passed an 
initiative in 1922 banning parochial schools.65 The Court 
invalidated this law in Pierce v. Society of the Sisters of the Holy 
 
 61. See KYVIG, supra note 7, at 260 (stating that “one or both houses of twenty-one 
state legislatures had rejected the amendment”). Kansas rejected the CLA in 1925, and 
that Legislature’s attempt to overturn this result in 1937 was the main issue in Coleman. 
See Coleman v. Miller, 307 U.S. 433, 435–36 (1939); see id. at 447–50 (concluding that 
Congress could recognize a state ratification even though there had been a prior 
rejection). 
 62. See Reva B. Siegel, She The People: The Nineteenth Amendment, Sex Equality, 
Federalism, and the Family, 115 HARV. L. REV. 947, 1010 (2002) (explaining that the CLA 
“fell victim in the ratification phase to a conservative network including the Sentinels of 
the Republic, the Woman Patriots, the National Association of Manufacturers, the 
American Farm Bureau Federation, and a small number of prominent religious 
leaders”). 
 63. Barbara Bennett Woodhouse, “Who Owns The Child?”: Meyer and Pierce and 
the Child as Property, 33 WM. & MARY L. REV. 995, 1062 (1992) (“Mainstream Catholics 
viewed the Amendment with alarm, believing it posed a danger to parochial education 
and transferred to the state powers that ought to belong to parents.”); see also 
TRATTNER, supra note 7, at 176 (“[T]he opposition of the Catholic Church in 
Massachusetts was a telling blow.”); id. (describing Catholic criticism of the CLA in 
Massachusetts and New York due to the threat “to the Church’s prerogatives, especially 
in the field of education.”). 
 64. See Letter from Charles F. Hurley, Gov. of Massachusetts, to FDR (Feb. 3, 
1937), at 2 (on file with the FDR Presidential Library) (“Education might conceivably 
fall within the scope of their authority, since “Labor” means any mental or physical 
exertion.”) [hereinafter Hurley Letter]; Warn on Child Labor Ban, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 8, 
1937, at 5 (discussing the “[f]ear that adoption of the Federal Child Labor Amendment 
might lead to abolition of Roman Catholic parochial schools”); see also TRATTNER, 
supra note 7, at 171–72 (stating that “Roman Catholics and some Lutherans” worried 
about the CLA “since the dictionary definition of labor was ‘physical or mental toll’”) cf. 
KYVIG, supra note 7, at 259 (quoting the resolution of the Georgia Legislature, which 
rejected the CLA saying that it would give Congress “all state authority over 
education”). 
 65. See Pierce v. Soc’y of the Sisters of the Holy Names of Jesus & Mary, 268 U.S. 
510, 530–32 (1925) (describing the law and the constitutional challenge by a Catholic 
school); Woodhouse, supra note 63, at 1017 (noting that the Ku Klux Klan was 
instrumental in the passage of the Oregon plan). 
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Names of Jesus and Mary,66 but that case was still pending when 
many states (including Massachusetts) considered the CLA.67 
Even after Pierce was decided, the proposal still disturbed 
Catholics because it could be construed as allowing Congress to 
enact the same kind of sweeping prohibition.68 
A related line of attack, which came mostly from 
conservative groups such as the Sentinels of the Republic, was 
that the CLA was a dangerous invasion of parental authority.69 
One state representative said that in recent years “[t]hey have 
taken our women away from us by constitutional amendment, 
they have taken our liquor away from us; and now they want to 
take our children.”70 In part, this argument stemmed from the 
assumption that the wages of child workers (and therefore the 
decision about whether they should work) belonged to their 
parents.71 The more emotional appeals against the CLA raised 
 
 66. 268 U.S. 510 (1925); id. at 534 (holding that “the right to conduct schools was 
property and that parents and guardians, as a part of their liberty, might direct the 
education of children by selecting reputable teachers and places”). 
 67. Massachusetts, for example, held a non-binding referendum on the CLA in 
November 1924 that resulted in a landslide against the proposal. See TRATTNER, supra 
note 7, at 176. Pierce was not decided until 1925. 
 68. CLA supporters responded that there were no cases equating labor with 
education, therefore the concern about school autonomy was unwarranted. See, e.g., Text 
of Gov. Lehman’s Appeal for Child Labor Amendment, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 6, 1937, at 4 
(“For centuries we have had laws dealing with both subjects, yet nobody has mixed them 
up. Our law books are filled with decisions holding to the contrary and stating that labor 
means physical toll, not the process of acquiring an education.”) [hereinafter Lehman 
Appeal].  
 69. See, e.g., 65 CONG. REC. 7174 (1924) (statement of Rep. Crisp) (“[T]his 
proposed amendment goes further, in my judgment, than any amendment that has ever 
been proposed to the Constitution so far as the control of human rights is concerned—
the God-given, inalienable right of parents to regulate and control their own children 
whom God gave them.”); id. at 10,097 (statement of Sen. Ransdell) (“Just as soon as the 
children are large enough to be of some assistance to their real parents they must be 
delivered to their statutory father in Washington.”); KYVIG, supra note 7, at 258–59 
(describing the Sentinels of the Republic as an organization that “looked back unhappily 
at every amendment from the Fourteenth onward”); Novkov, supra note 7, at 399–400 
(quoting an anti-CLA radio address in Massachusetts that asked “Christian mothers” 
whether they could “afford to gamble with your children’s happiness at stake? Can you 
afford to risk contamination of the Massachusetts home?”); Sherman, supra note 7, at 8 
(stating that a common charge against the CLA was that “[p]arental control of children 
would be surrendered to the bureaucracy”). 
 70. TRATTNER, supra note 7, at 171; see Woodhouse, supra note 63, at 1065 
(quoting the Columbia University President’s view that “[n]o American mother would 
favor the adoption of an amendment that would empower Congress to invade the rights 
of parents and to shape family life to its liking”). 
 71. See, e.g., Woodhouse, supra note 63, at 1064 (“Children who received pay 
envelopes were expected to turn them over to the parent unopened.”). As with parochial 
education, the issue of parental rights was a live one during the 1920s. See Meyer v. 
Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923) (holding that the Due Process Clause protected the 
right to “establish a home and bring up children”). 
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the specter of a federal ban on household chores or the 
involuntary removal of children from their parents.72 
Accordingly, critics often referred to the proposal as the “Youth 
Control Amendment.”73 
Another powerful theme of the opposition was that the 
CLA could be enforced only through very intrusive means, 
which fed on the growing unpopularity of Prohibition.74 One 
state representative captured this feeling by stating that 
congressional power over child labor would “undoubtedly 
necessitate the appointment of a horde of snooping, 
meddlesome and tax-consuming investigators and officials 
reminiscent of the odious activities of those employed to enforce 
the Federal prohibition laws.”75 Most of the divisive civil liberties 
cases during the 1920s involved alcohol, and thus the argument 
that yet another amendment that expanded federal authority 
could lead to a diminution of privacy was reasonable.76 More 
 
 72. See KYVIG, supra note 7, at 259–60 (quoting a CLA supporter who said that 
voters “had been told the most amazing things and were afraid the government was going 
to step in and take their children from them, that children were to be prevented from 
working in the home or on the farm, that no child under eighteen was to be allowed to do 
any thing but school work, that parents were to be deprived of the authority over the 
children, and much more of the same kind”); Sherman, supra note 7, at 11–12 
(“[C]harges were circulated that even household chores would be forbidden if the 
amendment were ratified.”); cf. Hurley Letter, supra note 64, at 2 (“It is not too fantastic 
to visualize . . . compulsory military training, involuntary work on public projects, forced 
attendance in concentration camps.”). 
 73. See Brief of Petitioners at 31, Coleman v. Miller, 307 U.S. 433 (1939) (No. 7) 
(quoting an ABA Journal article that referred to the CLA as the “Child Control 
Amendment”); see also Lehman Appeal, supra note 68, at 4 (“It is also claimed that the 
amendment seriously interferes with the home and with parental authority. . . . They call 
it a ‘Youth Control Amendment.’”). 
 74. See, e.g., KYVIG, supra note 7, at 261 (“No doubt resistance to further 
amendment was linked to the unhappiness with national prohibition that continued to 
grow throughout the 1920s.”); TRATTNER, supra note 7, at 170 (stating that an argument 
against the CLA was that it “would mean an ominous increase of federal power, and an 
extensive bureaucracy would arise to enforce the laws that would be enacted”). 
 75. Hurley Letter, supra note 64, at 3; see also 65 CONG. REC. 7195 (1924) 
(statement of Rep. Hawes) (“[I]t will build up a great national bureau, with thousands of 
police, called inspectors, who will intrude themselves into the homes, the schools, and the 
private affairs of the citizens of our States.”); Warn, supra note 2, at 20 (“‘Governor 
Lehman has said that Congress is composed of reasonable men. But what about the 
Eighteenth Amendment and the Volsted Act?’” (quoting Charles McConnell, New York 
Assemblyman)); cf. TRATTNER, supra note 7, at 171 (“The prohibition (and, to some 
extent, the woman suffrage) amendment altered the views of many regarding sumptuary 
legislation and left widespread antagonism toward reformers and constitutional 
change.”). 
 76. See Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 466 (1928) (upholding the use of 
wiretaps to enforce Prohibition against a Fourth Amendment challenge), overruled by 
Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967); KYVIG, supra note 7, at 276–77 (discussing 
some examples); see generally Robert Post, Federalism, Positive Law, and the Emergence 
of the American Administrative State: Prohibition in the Taft Court Era, 48 WM. & MARY 
!!MAGLIOCCA-272-CHILDLABORAMENDMENT3.DOC (DO NOT DELETE) 10/17/2011  9:53 AM 
470 CONSTITUTIONAL COMMENTARY [Vol. 27:455 
 
broadly, this unease about Prohibition energized those who 
argued against the CLA on traditional federalism grounds.77 
Moving from the plane of principle to politics, the business 
and agricultural interests that benefited from child labor were 
also active in fighting the CLA.78 For instance, the textile 
industry took a strong stand against anything that would deprive 
them of the dainty hands that worked the power looms.79 
Newspaper publishers were critical of the proposal because 
paperboys were a key link in the distribution chain.80 Farmers’ 
organizations fought the CLA because youth were essential for 
the operation of family farms.81 And the Manufacturer’s Record, 
a leading commercial trade journal, contended that the CLA 
“would be the greatest thing ever done in America in behalf of 
the activities of Hell. It would make millions of young people . . . 
idlers in brain and body, and thus make them the devil’s best 
workshop.”82 Of course, the CLA did not require the abolition of 
 
L. REV. 1 (2006) (exploring this issue in depth). 
 77. The states’-rights criticism was weak given that the CLA said that state 
regulation of child labor was not preempted. See Coleman v. Miller, 307 U.S. 433, 435 n.1 
(1939) (quoting § 2 of the CLA, which stated “[t]he power of the several States is 
unimpaired by this article except that the operation of State laws shall be suspended to 
the extent necessary to give effect to legislation enacted by the Congress”). But the issue 
was still raised. See KYVIG, supra note 7, at 309 (stating that the American Bar 
Association “decried the amendment as an unwarranted federal invasion of the rights of 
states and families”); Novkov, supra note 7, at 400 (stating that the best argument against 
the CLA was that the “amendment would allow for improper federal control over the 
authority of the states”). 
 78. See, e.g., 65 CONG. REC. 7278 (1924) (statement of Rep. Perlman) (“Who are 
opposed to this amendment? In the main those who wish to exploit children for their 
own profit.”); TRATTNER, supra note 7, at 173 (“The National Association of 
Manufacturers made defeat of the amendment its major item of business for 1924.”); 
Novkov, supra note 7, at 402 (“[T]he image of the American icon of the yeoman farmer 
subjected to federal control was meant to frighten potential amendment supporters.”). 
 79. See KYVIG, supra note 7, at 258 (explaining that textile manufacturers mounted 
the successful court challenges in Dagenhart and Bailey and played an important role in 
opposing the CLA); TRATTNER, supra note 7, at 174 (noting that one of the leading 
agrarian lobbies against the CLA was “actually headed by the cashier of a cotton mill 
bank in North Carolina; [and] its vice-president was an employee of a cotton mill store”). 
 80. See KYVIG, supra note 7, at 258 (“Newspaper publishers, employers of young 
boys for sales and delivery, joined in the attack.”). 
 81. See Sherman, supra note 7, at 11 (“[A]grarian hostility to the child labor 
amendment was substantial. A large proportion of the working children ages ten to 
fifteen were engaged in agricultural pursuits. Although statutory regulation of such labor 
was not then proposed by supporters of the amendment, many farmers were certainly 
apprehensive that such interference would be forthcoming.” (footnote omitted)); 
Browning Opposes the Law, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 9, 1937, at 5 (quoting the Tennessee 
Governor, who opposed the CLA because he was “not ready to turn over to a 
Washington bureau the discrimination as to whether a farmer can have his boy help him 
make a crop”). 
 82. TRATTNER, supra note 7, at 173. 
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any form of child labor—the text only authorized Congress to do 
so—but that point was often lost in the heat of the debate.83 
Finally, there was the claim that the CLA was just part of a 
communist plot to destroy America.84 The official publication of 
the Boston archdiocese argued during the debate in 
Massachusetts that the Amendment was “more in keeping with 
Soviet Russia than with the fundamental principles of the 
American Government.”85 In New York, a state representative 
stated that “I do not accuse all of those who favor this 
amendment of being Communists or Socialists merely because 
all Communists and Socialists favor it, but I do claim that far 
beyond the innocent and plausible purpose of many sincere 
people there is definitely sinister purpose . . . .”86 These 
outrageous charges probably got a sympathetic hearing because 
of the recent establishment of the Soviet Union and the fear 
created by the Russian Revolution. 
 
 83. See Coleman v. Miller, 307 U.S. 433, 435 n.1 (1939) (“The Congress shall have 
power to limit, regulate, and prohibit the labor of persons under eighteen years of age.”); 
cf. TRATTNER, supra note 7, at 169 (quoting The New Republic’s view that “[t]he friends 
of the amendment were totally unprepared to combat the flood of distorted propaganda 
which let loose upon them. They had been accustomed to argue [sic] their case before 
reasonable and attentive human beings. They suddenly found themselves compelled to 
discuss a matter of public policy with a monstrous jazz band”). 
 84. See, e.g., 65 CONG. REC. 9963 (1924) (quoting the petition of the Woman Patriot 
Publishing Co., which asserted that the CLA “is a straight Socialist measure. It is also 
promoted under direct orders from Moscow”); Novkov, supra note 7, at 399 (“[Critics] 
appealed to fears of communism and socialism by portraying the amendment as merely a 
first step in a sinister plan to establish complete state control . . . .”); Sherman, supra note 
7, at 9 (“[R]ed-scare tactics were widely used to condemn the child labor amendment as 
un-American, and there is no doubt that this approach was an important factor in its 
defeat.”). 
 85. Sherman, supra note 7, at 13; see 65 CONG. REC. 10,088 (1924) (statement of 
Sen. Reed) (“People are advocating this measure who have advocated everything 
socialistic and destructive; people are advocating this measure who have been going to 
school literally to those doctrinaires of Russia, who think that the child is the ward of the 
state; that it should be taken from its mother’s arms and put under the tutelage and 
supervision of state officials.”). 
 86. Warn, supra note 2, at 20 (quoting Laurens M. Hamilton); see also TRATTNER, 
supra note 7, at 172 (“Opponents of child labor reform deliberately aroused these 
feelings, stigmatizing the amendment as a subversive movement spawned by the Russian 
Revolution, thus adding another dimension to the arguments against it.”); Warn, supra 
note 2, at 20 (“‘Those who favor the present amendment will not realize that in seeking 
to free children from one form of slavery they may well be delivering those same children 
and generations yet unborn to the same kind of controlled, regimented legal slavery that 
children in other parts of the world are subjected to.’” (quoting Laurens M. Hamilton, 
New York State Assemblyman). 
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B. THE TWENTIETH AND TWENTY-FIRST AMENDMENTS 
Notwithstanding the inability of state legislatures to ratify 
the CLA, when Congress proposed two new constitutional 
amendments in the early 1930s there was no sign that the debate 
had changed any minds about Article Five. The Twentieth 
Amendment, which revised the start of the presidential and 
congressional terms and presidential selection procedures under 
unusual conditions, was sent to the States in the traditional way 
in 1932 and ratified in less than a year.87 The Twenty-First 
Amendment was passed in 1933 with a requirement that state 
conventions ratify the repeal of Prohibition, but that was a 
special exception unconnected to the CLA.88 
Anti-Prohibitionists argued that the convention route was 
necessary because too many state legislatures were skewed in 
favor of the “dry” faction and would not vote for repeal. The 
Wickersham Commission, which conducted a thorough review of 
Prohibition for President Hoover, concluded that the ratification 
of the Eighteenth Amendment was the result of malapportioned 
legislatures that over-represented rural voters who were more 
likely to support a ban on alcohol.89 Oddly enough, this 
confirmed the argument made by the critics of the CLA who 
claimed that state legislatures did not provide an adequate check 
on Article Five.90 Three of the commissioners took the position 
that Congress should submit any repeal of Prohibition for 
ratification by state conventions to bypass the opposition in the 
 
 87. See U.S. CONST. amend XX; KYVIG, supra note 7, at 274 (observing that the 
Twentieth Amendment was passed by Congress in March 1932 and ratified in January 
1933). This Amendment made four changes. First, the presidential and vice-presidential 
inauguration was moved to January 20th. See id. at § 1. Second, the start of the 
congressional session was moved up to January 3rd. See id. at § 2. Third, new procedures 
were established for what would happen if the President-elect died or was deemed 
ineligible prior to the inauguration. See id. § 3. Finally, procedures were established for 
what would happen if a candidate for President or Vice-President died in an election 
where no candidate received a majority of the electoral vote. See id. at § 4. For a 
discussion of these provisions, see AMAR, supra note 21, at 428–30. 
 88. See U.S. CONST. amend. XXI, § 1 (“The eighteenth article of amendment to the 
Constitution of the United States is hereby repealed.”); id. at § 3 (requiring ratification 
by state conventions). 
 89. See KYVIG, supra note 7, at 277–78 (describing the Wickersham Report); see 
also AMAR, supra note 21, at 416 (“State and congressional apportionment rules in the 
1910s had tended to favor rural and heavily native-born regions.); cf. Baker v. Carr, 369 
U.S. 186, 237 (1962) (holding that equal protection challenge to malapportioned state 
legislatures did not constitute a nonjusticiable political question). 
 90. See supra text accompanying notes 47–51. There is no indication that state 
legislative districting skewed the outcome with respect to the CLA or any other 
constitutional amendment. 
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state legislatures.91 The Democratic National Convention 
adopted this proposal as a platform plank in 1932, and Congress 
acted upon that recommendation a year later.92 
While the Twenty-First Amendment was seen as a 
significant precedent during the Court-packing debate, the 
convention method was used in 1933 because Prohibition was 
considered a unique case where the procedural choice made a 
substantive difference.93 There is no indication in the legislative 
history or in any other sources that the obstacles encountered by 
the CLA were a factor in that decision. And the ratification of 
the Twentieth Amendment confirms that there was no general 
change in attitude about the role of state legislatures even 
though the CLA had been pending for nine years at that point. It 
would take the guile and rhetoric of one of our greatest 
presidents to alter the understanding of Article Five. 
III. THE MISSING STORY OF THE 1937 CRISIS 
This Part discusses the previously unknown link between 
the CLA and the Court-packing plan from December 1936 until 
March 29, 1937, when the country learned of Justice Owen 
Roberts’ switch-in-time in West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish.94 
With the onset of the Great Depression, support for prohibiting 
child labor increased as a way to increase wages, and half of the 
States had ratified the Amendment by the beginning of 1937.95 
At that point, the President gave the CLA a strong endorsement. 
But appearances were deceiving. The inability of the States to 
ratify the Amendment, which FDR emphasized through his 
high-profile support, turned into one of his leading arguments 
for Court-packing. In the process, the CLA’s rough ride through 
 
 91. See KYVIG, supra note 7, at 278; see also AMAR, supra note 21, at 416 
(“[M]alapportionment lived on in many states, prompting Anti-Prohibitionists to 
sidestep state legislatures altogether in the ratification process.”). 
 92. See KYVIG, supra note 7, at 280–86 (summarizing the debate and the rapid 
ratification of the Twenty-First Amendment by the state conventions). 
 93. See infra text accompanying notes 131–139. 
 94. 300 U.S. 379, 399–400 (1937) (upholding the Washington minimum wage statute 
and overruling Adkins v. Children’s Hospital); ALSOP & CATLEDGE, supra note 3, at 144 
(stating that this case “was the great moment”); SOLOMON, supra note 3, at 159–62 
(discussing contemporary reactions to Justice Roberts’ about-face).  
 95. Luther A. Huston, Child Labor Amendment Hope Gains, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 17, 
1937, at 65 (noting that Kentucky ratified the CLA earlier in the week, making it the 
twenty-fifth state to do so); see also Novkov, supra note 7, at 395 (“A second and larger 
wave of ratifications began in 1933 and ran through 1937, reflecting a new concern with 
child labor borne of the Depression.”). 
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state legislatures became the operative precedent under Article 
Five. 
A. PROBING FDR’S CONSTITUTIONAL MOTIVES 
Let us begin by examining how the President got behind the 
CLA and why his action should be viewed with some skepticism. 
Following FDR’s overwhelming reelection, the Secretary of 
Labor, Francis Perkins, sent him a memo contending that “[t]he 
immediate outlook for ratification of the child labor amendment 
is encouraging but definite impetus by you is necessary to turn 
the scale. A letter from you to the incoming Governors of the 
States that have not ratified, which will have regular sessions in 
1937 would be immensely valuable.”96 FDR agreed and wrote 
that letter to great fanfare on January 8, 1937: 
I am sure you will agree with me that one of the most 
encouraging developments of the past few years is the general 
agreement that has been reached that child labor should be 
permanently abolished. 
. . . 
However, it is clearly indicated that child labor, especially in 
low-paid, unstandardized types of work, is increasing. I am 
convinced that nation-wide minimum standards are necessary 
and that a way should be found promptly to crystallize in legal 
safeguards public opinion in behalf of the elimination of child 
labor. 
Do you not agree with me that ratification of the child-labor 
amendment by the remaining twelve States whose action is 
necessary to place it in the Constitution is the obvious way to 
early achievement of our objective? I hope that you will agree 
that this can be made one of the major items in the legislative 
program of your State this year.97 
The White House was definitely interested in this issue, as I 
found a handwritten note of unknown authorship in FDR’s files 
 
 96. Perkins Memo, supra note 9, at 1; see Letter from Frances Perkins, Sec. of 
Labor, to Marvin H. McIntyre, Ass’t Sec’y to the President (Dec. 26, 1936) (on file with 
the FDR Presidential Library) (“I talked with the President after Cabinet meeting about 
sending this letter to the Governors of the 19 States which have not yet ratified the Child 
Labor Amendment. He said that he would like to do it, and asked me to prepare what I 
thought would be a suitable letter.”). 
 97. Roosevelt Pleads on Child Labor Act, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 9, 1937, at 5; see id. 
(“Many observers believe that the President’s plea will achieve the object, despite the 
stormy debates that have been waged on the subject of child labor.”). 
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listing all of the governors who received the letter and noting 
their replies.98 
All of this looks straightforward enough, but the timing of 
FDR’s intervention is curious because prior to 1937 he did not 
lift a finger to help the CLA. At a 1935 press conference, the 
President made his indifference clear: 
Q: It seems there is anti-child labor organization complaining 
that you are exerting influence with state legislatures to have 
that amendment ratified? 
THE PRESIDENT: Not exerting influence. I made my 
position very clear a year ago and I have stuck to that. 
Q: And that is? 
THE PRESIDENT: No change. I am in favor of it but I am 
exerting no influence.99 
His hands-off approach is partly explained by the National 
Industrial Recovery Act of 1933, which essentially suspended 
antitrust law and promoted cooperative practices within 
industries.100 These codes made great strides in reducing child 
 
 98. See FDR Official File 58-A (“Letters Sent to Governors and Gov. Elect of 
following states—re Child Labor Amendment”) (on file with the FDR Presidential 
Library); Press Conference No. 339, in 9 COMPLETE PRESIDENTIAL PRESS CONFERENCES 
OF FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT 108 (Da Capo Press 1972) (1937) (“Q: Have you heard from 
the nineteen Governors who wrote in regard to the child labor amendment? THE 
PRESIDENT: I think we have replies from every one of them and from the smaller states 
the information I get is that it looks pretty favorable.”).  
 99. Press Conference No. 182, in 5 COMPLETE PRESIDENTIAL PRESS 
CONFERENCES OF FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT 102–03 (Da Capo Press 1972) (1935). My 
search through the presidential archives in Hyde Park confirms that FDR was doing 
nothing to aid the CLA before 1937. He received many requests from CLA supporters 
for the kind of strong endorsement that he provided in 1937, see Letter of Courtney 
Dinwiddie, General Sec’y of the National Child Labor Committee, to FDR (Oct. 3, 1934) 
(on file with the FDR Presidential Library) (“Strong backing of the Amendment by the 
Administration, as the method for perpetuating the child labor gains, would, we are 
confident, insure success. If you agree, may we hope for your active support of the 
Amendment?”), but these requests were ignored or met with tepid statements. And 
when Francis Perkins drafted congratulatory telegrams for FDR to send to Indiana and 
Idaho upon their ratification of the CLA in 1935, the President told his aide to “forget 
about these.” See Memorandum of Francis Perkins, Sec’y of Labor, to Marvin McIntyre 
(Feb. 9, 1935) (on file with the FDR Presidential Library) (including her draft telegrams 
with a negative cover note attributed to FDR). 
 100. See FRIEDMAN, supra note 6, at 200 (“The NIRA attempted to deal with the 
problem of economic collapse by permitting businesses in different economic sectors to 
enter into cooperative codes of fair competition, which also were to include provisions 
for collective bargaining for wages and hours.”); TRATTNER, supra note 7, at 190 
(“Passed in June 1933 . . . the NIRA sought to end cutthroat competition by promoting 
cooperative action among trade groups, to raise prices by limiting production, and to 
guarantee labor a reasonable work week and decent wages.”). 
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labor and led the President to say in the 1934 State of the Union 
that the practice was “abolished.”101 Nevertheless, when the 
Court struck down the Act in A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. 
United States,102 FDR did not change his posture on the CLA.103 
The shift to a pro-amendment stance came only in 1937, which 
begs the question—why then? 
Furthermore, the President’s open support of the CLA is 
hard to reconcile with his private correspondence during the 
same period, which shows nothing but disdain for the Article 
Five process.104 For instance, just six weeks after his endorsement 
of the Amendment, he told a friend that no “controversial 
amendment, especially one which in effect is opposed by a 
political party, has ever been passed within a short space of 
time.”105 FDR told Felix Frankfurter (then a member of the 
Harvard faculty) at about the same time that if he was “without 
a conscience, I would gladly undertake for a drawing account of 
fifteen or twenty million dollars (easy enough to raise) to 
guarantee that an amendment would not be ratified . . . . In other 
words, I think I could prevent ratification in thirteen states.”106 
Finally, he confided to his White House Press Secretary that 
ratification of any amendment was unlikely since it was easy “for 
moneyed interests to buy up enough legislatures to prevent 
action.”107 
The most revealing comment came in a letter to Charles C. 
Burlingham in which FDR explained why he was pursuing 
 
 101. TRATTNER, supra note 7, at 196; see id. at 190–95 (discussing the impact of these 
codes on child labor); Letter from FDR to Courtenay Dinwiddie, National Child Labor 
Committee (Nov. 8, 1934) (on file with FDR Presidential Library) (“One of the 
accomplishments under the National Recovery Act which has given me the greatest 
gratification is the outlawing of child labor.”). 
 102. 295 U.S. 495 (1935). 
 103. See KYVIG, supra note 7, at 308 (explaining that Schechter “rendered child labor 
restrictions, along with the other features of the codes, unenforceable”); TRATTNER, 
supra note 7, at 200 (stating that “the child employment curve shot upward again” after 
Schechter).  
 104. The President’s public comments were also inconsistent with his stated position 
on the CLA, as just one day before his letter he told Congress in his State of the Union 
that “there is little fault to be found with the Constitution of the United States as it 
stands today. The vital need is not an alteration of our fundamental law, but an 
increasingly enlightened view with reference to it.” KYVIG, supra note 7, at 302. 
 105. Letter from FDR to Arthur F. Mullen (Feb. 25, 1937) (on file with the FDR 
Presidential Library). 
 106. KYVIG, supra note 7, at 303 (quoting a letter from FDR to Frankfurter dated 
February 9, 1937). 
 107. LEUCHTENBURG, supra note 6, at 111 (quoting a diary entry recording a 
conversation between Press Secretary Early and Raymond Clopper); see also id. at 282 
n.100 (stating that this entry was dated February 8, 1937).  
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Court-packing instead of a constitutional amendment to secure 
the New Deal. He told Burlingham that “[i]f you were not as 
scrupulous and ethical as you happen to be, you could make five 
million dollars as easy as rolling off a log by undertaking a 
campaign to prevent the ratification by one house of the 
Legislature, or even the summoning of a constitutional 
convention in thirteen states for the next four years. Easy 
money.”108 This was illuminating because Burlingham was the 
head of the Nonpartisan Committee for Ratification of the 
Federal Child Labor Amendment!109 In effect, FDR was saying 
that the whole project was a waste of time. If the President 
believed that and felt free to express that view in private to one 
of the CLA’s chief supporters, then why did he back the 
Amendment in public? 
One explanation for the strange timing and for the 
inconsistency behind FDR’s support of the CLA is that in 
January 1937 he was secretly preparing the Court-packing 
plan.110 Attorney General Homer Cummings was the only 
Cabinet member aware of the President’s scheme, and the 
proposal was put together with the help of only a few Justice 
Department attorneys until its release on February 5th.111 A 
connection between the Court-packing plan and the President’s 
intensified support of the CLA is suggested by the fact, discussed 
in the next section, that the Administration used the failure of 
the state ratification process as a significant argument for judicial 
reform.112 Ironically, Herbert Hoover was the first person to see 
this link when he joined FDR’s call for the ratification of the 
CLA because it was “important that we have orderly 
 
 108. Letter from FDR to Charles C. Burlingham (Feb. 23, 1937) (on file with the 
FDR Presidential Library), at 1. 
 109. Dr. Butler Fights Child Labor Law, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 18, 1937, at 2. 
 110. For some background on the President’s thinking about Court-packing, see 
ALSOP & CATLEDGE, supra note 3, at 22–37 (discussing his deliberations after the 1936 
presidential election); LEUCHTENBURG, supra note 6, at 82–131 (reaching back even 
further into FDR’s first term). 
 111. ALSOP & CATLEDGE, supra note 3, at 43 (“At the White House the President 
nursed his delightful secret, while Homer Cummings and the serious, hard-working 
Solicitor General, Stanley Reed, labored over their papers and law books at the Justice 
Department. Only one man was allowed to help them—Cummings’ personal assistant, 
Alexander Holtzoff . . . .”); SOLOMON, supra note 3, at 93 (“Night after night during the 
following weeks, Homer Cummings used a secluded entrance into the White House to 
confer with the president and then slip away unseen.”); see also FRIEDMAN, supra note 6, 
at 217 (stating that the plan was announced in a Cabinet meeting on February 5, 1937). 
 112. See infra text accompanying notes 119–128. 
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constitutional change instead of pressure on the independence of 
the Supreme Court.”113 
The critical difference between Hoover and the White 
House must have rested with their respective assessments of the 
likelihood that the CLA would be ratified. After all, Hoover’s 
view was right with the assumption that the proposal would be 
adopted by three-fourths of the States. The ratification of an 
Article Five amendment would undercut the argument that 
constitutional change could be achieved only by enlarging the 
Court. This makes FDR’s support of the CLA even more 
inexplicable, especially since just one day before he introduced 
the Court-packing proposal he sent a public telegram urging the 
New York Legislature to ratify the CLA.114 
The fog surrounding the President’s actions disappears if we 
assume that he was sure the CLA would not be ratified. In that 
case, backing the Amendment would not harm the Court plan. 
Instead, it would reinforce the argument that Article Five was 
obsolete. There was a robust expectation in February, created 
partly by FDR’s public appeal, that the CLA would be ratified.115 
Indeed, the opinion polls (crude as they were at the time) 
demonstrated that the proposal was favored by seventy-six 
percent of voters and commanded a majority in every single 
state.116 Failure of the ratification process in light of this 
widespread support would make it clear that the constitutional 
will of the nation could not be expressed through standard 
means. This is what the President was counting on because he 
 
 113. Hoover Supports Roosevelt in an Appeal for Early Ratification of Child Labor 
Ban, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 11, 1937, at 6; see supra text accompanying note 2 (making the 
same connection in the debate on the CLA in the New York Legislature). 
 114. See Roosevelt Spurs Child Labor Foes, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 5, 1937, at 12 (“I want 
all friends and supporters of the Child Labor Amendment to the Constitution to know 
that my attitude toward this measure to protect the rights of childhood has not changed. 
Only last month I wrote a letter to the Governors of nineteen States asking that 
ratification of the amendment be made one of the major items in the legislative program 
in their States this year. I sincerely hope that my own State will be among those to 
ratify.”). 
 115. See Huston, supra note 95, at 65 (“[S]upporters of the amendment and 
observers of the legislative trends feel that the assertion that 1937 may be the year in 
which the Twenty-second Amendment to the Constitution will join other historic 
changes in the basic law, is not without foundation.”); see also Child Labor Ban Gains 
Momentum, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 7, 1937, at 68 (stating that the CLA “is increasingly 
debated” and “seems destined at last for approval by the Legislature” in New York). 
 116. TRATTNER, supra note 7, at 201–02 (describing this poll); see also Letter from 
John Tibby, Associate Editor of the American Institute of Public Opinion to Stephen 
Early, Assistant Secretary to FDR (Jan. 12, 1937) (providing a poll that showed majority 
support for the CLA in forty-five of the forty-eight states). 
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wanted the Court-packing plan to get through Congress.117 
Though there is no direct evidence in FDR’s papers that spells 
out his thinking on this point, no other explanation is 
convincing.118 
The most plausible alternative theory is that the President’s 
support of the CLA was an independent fallback position in case 
his effort to pack the Court failed, but this interpretation is not 
supported by the facts.  First, FDR’s lack of interest in the CLA 
prior to 1937 works against the view that it was not connected to 
his confrontation with the Justices.  Second, he did not express 
support for any other proposed constitutional amendment in 
1937.  If pursuing reform through Article Five were a realistic 
option, one would think that the President would have at least 
taken an interest in some of the textual amendments that were 
being discussed in Congress.  Third, the logical time for pushing 
the CLA as Plan B would have been after the defeat of the 
Court scheme, not while it was under consideration.  The more 
closely one looks at the issue, the more clear it becomes that 
FDR was simply using the CLA as a stalking horse for Court-
packing.  
B. ARTICLE THREE OR ARTICLE FIVE? 
Further proof for the hypothesis that the President used the 
CLA as a political lever can be found in his acts following the 
announcement of the Court-packing plan. The White House 
launched a coordinated campaign to sell the message that the 
CLA’s failure in the state legislatures showed that Article Five 
could not be relied upon to overcome the Supreme Court’s 
resistance to the New Deal.119 At the same time, however, FDR 
 
 117. Since Francis Perkins was unaware of the Court-packing plan when she wrote 
her memo to FDR, see supra text accompanying note 96, her support for the CLA must 
be taken as genuine. 
 118. See infra text accompanying note 135 (describing Republican claims that FDR 
was not truly interested in the ratification of the CLA).  
 119. See Map a Farm Drive to Push Court Bill, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 28, 1937, at 35 
(quoting Senator Pope of Idaho, who said that “Is it not certain that most of those who 
are bitterly opposed to the President’s proposal would also be opposed to any 
amendment to enlarge the powers of Congress to enact social legislation? The same 
influences that have so long delayed the ratification of the Child Labor Amendment will 
be active in delaying, if not defeating, any other such constitutional amendment.”); Time 
Factor, supra note 23, at 54 (“[T]hose favoring court reform by statute are prepared to 
cite the thirteen-year retardation of the proposed Child Labor Amendment as an 
example of the time involved in driving an amendment through three-fourths of the 
forty-eight States. They are ready to say that the course of this proposed addition to the 
charter proves conclusively what can be done when power is applied to opposition.”). 
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continued to express his support for the Amendment.120 What is 
often overlooked is that while the country was debating the 
Court’s future in February and March 1937, the CLA was under 
active consideration in the States, and there was a feedback loop 
between the two issues that operated in the President’s favor 
until Congress launched a surprise initiative at the end of 
March.121 
For example, the leading spokesman for the 
Administration’s plan was Attorney General Cummings, and on 
February 15 he gave a national radio address that explained why 
the CLA experience was an argument in favor of Court-packing: 
Those who are violently opposing the President’s 
recommendations insist the reforms he seeks to bring about 
should be accomplished by amending the Constitution and by 
that method alone. This is the strategy of delay and the last 
resort of those who desire to prevent the adoption of any 
Constitutional amendment. The child labor amendment, 
submitted thirteen years ago, has not yet been ratified.122 
Just one week later, though, Cummings spoke on behalf of 
the CLA in hearings held by the New York Assembly: 
The vital problem of child labor can best be solved by nation-
wide  action. The amendment would clearly empower the 
Congress to deal with the matter. The suggestion advanced by 
certain opponents of the amendment that it may result in 
prohibiting children to help their parents at home or on the 
farm is not entitled to a moment’s consideration. It is a mere 
device to distract attention from the merits of the amendment 
itself.”123 
 
 120. See Telegram from Taylor E. Julien to FDR (Feb. 8, 1937) (on file with the 
FDR Presidential Library) (asking the President whether the CLA should be supported 
vigorously with a cover note from FDR stating “Write him today and say ‘Yes.’”); see 
also Memorandum from F.H. LaGuardia, Mayor of New York to FDR (Mar, 27, 1937) 
(reporting on the Maryland Legislature’s consideration of the CLA at the request of the 
White House). 
 121. See Child Amendment Votes, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 12, 1937, at 3 (stating that New 
Mexico ratified the CLA but was rejected by South Dakota); see also Ratified by 28th 
State, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 26, 1937, at 6 (noting the ratification by Kansas). For more on the 
national debate about Court-packing, see ACKERMAN, supra note 3, at 317–33; ALSOP & 
CATLEDGE, supra note 3, at 63–134; LEUCHTENBURG, supra note 6, at 132–42. The New 
York Times headline of March 10, 1937 was a rather vivid representation of this link. See 
supra text accompanying notes 11–12. 
 122. Address by Homer Cummings, Att’y Gen. of the United States (NBC, CBS, and 
Mutual Broadcasting radio broadcast Feb 15. 1937). The Attorney General said the same 
thing to the Senate Judiciary Committee. See supra note 13. 
 123. W.A. Warn, Roosevelt Makes Child Labor Plea to the Assembly, N.Y. TIMES, 
Feb. 23, 1937, at 1; see id. (“Advocates and opponents of ratification voiced their pleas 
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The President added to these mixed signals by sending yet 
another telegram to New York on the same day urging 
ratification.124 
This brings us back to the Fireside Chat of March 9, in 
which he gave a detailed defense of the Court-packing plan and 
put a new spin on the state ratification process.125 In that speech, 
FDR said that “[n]o amendment which any powerful economic 
interests or the leaders of any powerful political party have had 
reason to oppose has ever been ratified within anything like a 
reasonable time” and he observed that thirteen states with just 
five percent of the population could veto any proposal.126 There 
is no doubt that this passage referred to the CLA, as no other 
amendment supported the President’s claim.127 With this 
statement, he was pulling a bait-and-switch by asking voters to 
see a current event (the fight over the CLA) as emblematic of 
Article Five. That effort was made possible by FDR’s cagey 
decision to make the public more aware of the CLA through his 
endorsement. What is remarkable is that the President’s rhetoric 
was so powerful that modern lawyers simply accept without 
question that what he said is true. 
The substance of the Fireside Chat and FDR’s political 
sense was vindicated in the following three weeks as the CLA 
ran out of gas. Not only did New York reject the proposal 
shortly before the President’s speech, but Connecticut, 
Massachusetts, and Nebraska also voted no in March.128 At that 
 
for more than six hours in an atmosphere of high tension rarely paralleled at a legislative 
hearing. The Assembly chamber and galleries were filled. Not in a generation had a 
hearing on a legislative measure attracted so large a throng.”). 
 124. Id. (“I am informed that the Child Labor Amendment will come up for 
discussion today at a public hearing before the Judiciary Committee of the Assembly. 
The bill having passed the Senate, I sincerely trust that the House will take similar 
favorable action as quickly as possible. I hope very much that my own home State will be 
prompt in ratification.”). 
 125. See supra text accompanying notes 3–6. 
 126. Fireside Chat, supra note 1, at 131. 
 127. Time Factor, supra note 23, at 54 (“Advocacy of an amendment is, the 
administration says through Mr. Cummings, the last resort of those objecting to anything 
new, and indeed is utterly impractical because of the tedious and uncertain ratification 
process. But this is met with statements that on the average only about fifteen and one-
third months were necessary for the State sanction of the last eleven changes in the 
supreme law of the land. Seven of these eleven amendments were ratified by three-
fourths of the States in less than one year.”); see also KYVIG, supra note 7, at 304 (“The 
president made no mention of recent episodes that suggested otherwise about the time 
needed to achieve an amendment. The lame duck and prohibition repeal amendments of 
1933 did less to stir confidence than the thwarted child labor amendment did to provoke 
contrary expectations.”). 
 128. See supra text accompanying notes 7–11; see also Connecticut Bars Child 
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point, “[e]ven the most ardent backers of the proposal conceded 
that it was highly improbable that it would be written into the 
Constitution this year.”129 Opponents of the Court-packing plan 
in Congress, however, were about to upset the President’s 
calculations. 
Three days after FDR’s Fireside Chat, The New York Times 
ran an editorial entitled “Child Labor: What Now?” that 
described the state of play with respect to the CLA.130 After 
stating that “[n]othing can disguise the fact that the action of the 
New York Assembly is a serious setback for the child labor 
amendment,” the Times contended that Congress should draft a 
new CLA and “follow the precedent of prohibition repeal, not to 
the Legislatures but to ‘conventions’ of the States.”131 Citing 
recent public opinion polls, the editorial stated that it was 
“extremely probable” that such a proposal would be ratified.132 
On March 27, Senator Arthur Vandenberg, a Republican 
from Michigan, followed up on this suggestion and introduced a 
revised CLA with a convention requirement.133 The Senator 
stated that if the Administration got behind his idea the CLA 
could be ratified within ninety days.134 Savvy political strategists, 
 
Amendment, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 19, 1937, at 3 (discussing the CLA’s defeat by the 
Connecticut state house); Child Labor Curb Doomed This Year, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 21, 
1937, at 13 (“The Child Labor Amendment to the Federal Constitution, approved by 
only four States in 1937, appeared today to have slight prospect of full ratification this 
year . . . .”); Ban on Child Labor Suffers New Blow, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 27, 1937, at 4 
(discussing the rejection of the CLA by the Nebraska Legislature) [hereinafter New 
Blow]; To End Child Labor, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 26, 1937, at 20 (noting the no vote in 
Massachusetts) [hereinafter End Child Labor]. 
 129. New Blow, supra note 128, at 4. 
 130. Child Labor: What Now?, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 12, 1937, at 22 [hereinafter What 
Now?]. 
 131. Id.; End Child Labor, supra note 128, at 20 (“The new amendment, following 
the precedent of prohibition repeal, should be submitted to ‘conventions’ and not to the 
Legislatures of the States. This is the way, and at present it is the only way, of submitting 
the proposal directly to the people; and there seems to be little doubt that they would 
overwhelmingly approve it.”). 
 132. See What Now?, supra note 130, at 22 (stating that eighty-three percent of 
voters supported the CLA in New York despite its rejection by the Assembly); id. (“As 
the delegates to such conventions have no other function than to vote for or against the 
amendment, the popular vote electing delegates is virtually a direct referendum on the 
question.”). 
 133. Vandenberg Gives a New Amendment to Ban Child Labor, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 28, 
1937, at 18 [hereinafter New Amendment]. His proposal also contained some revised text 
that allowed Congress to “limit and prohibit” child labor but not to “regulate” the 
practice, defined the object of the authority as “labor for hire” and not “labor,” and 
lowered the age from eighteen to sixteen. See Vandenberg, supra note 15, at 22. 
 134. See Vandenberg, supra note 15, at 22; see also Louis Stark, New National Labor 
Laws Pondered, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 4, 1937, at 70 (“A storm of opposition to the 
Vandenberg resolution is already brewing among the proponents of the pending 
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however, understood that FDR would never embrace the 
Vandenberg Amendment because a real prospect of ratification 
would kill the Court plan: 
Some Republican observers expressed the belief that it would 
not be considered good strategy by President Roosevelt and 
his advisers to push for immediate ratification of a child labor 
amendment because the failure of the necessary thirty-six 
States to ratify the pending amendment is one of the most 
telling arguments used by proponents of the President’s court 
plan against counter-proposals to accomplish the end which 
he has in view by means of a constitutional amendment.135 
While Vandenberg’s intent is just as obscure as the President’s, it 
is doubtful that he brought forward a new CLA just because he 
liked kids. After all, the Senator was a leading critic of Court-
packing and was busy organizing a bipartisan coalition to oppose 
the President.136 It would have been an amazing coincidence if 
the new amendment were proposed for reasons that were 
completely unconnected to the Court fight, just as it is hard to 
believe that FDR suddenly took an interest in the CLA in 
January without an ulterior motive.137 
The Vandenberg Amendment contains several remarkable 
features that merit discussion. First, the new-and-improved CLA 
was a brilliant attempt to outflank the President. If he supported 
the proposal and it was ratified quickly, that would be 
devastating to his argument that Article Five was now an 
anachronism. If he opposed the idea, then that would open FDR 
 
amendment; it is being held in check only by the preoccupation of Congress with the 
President’s judiciary reform program. The Senator from Michigan, however, has 
promised to press his plan at the first opportunity. He says he is certain that his proposed 
amendment could be ratified by thirty-six States in ninety days.”).  
 135. New Amendment, supra note 133, at 1. Granted, there were others who took the 
President at his word that he wanted the CLA ratified. See Vandenberg, supra note 15, at 
22 (“It has been suggested that the President might refuse to support a new amendment 
of this sort on the ground that the long delay in approval of the old child labor 
amendment has been the chief argument against referring the proposal to enlarge the 
court directly to the people in the form of a constitutional amendment. But it is 
inconceivable that the President, of all people, would do anything to prolong the 
exploitation of children for one day simply in the hope of scoring a political point.”).  
 136. See LEUCHTENBURG, supra note 6, at 140 (describing Senator Vandenberg’s 
planning on how to oppose the President); see also ACKERMAN, supra note 3, at 332 
(stating that Vandenberg gave a national radio address on March 2 attacking the Court-
packing proposal). 
 137. The Senate Judiciary Committee approved the Vandenberg Amendment in 
June, New Child Labor Amendment Put to Senate; Committee Is Unanimous for 16-Year 
Limit, N.Y. TIMES, Jun. 22, 1937, at 1, but the proposal never reached the floor because 
by then abolishing child labor by statute was the preferred solution. See infra text 
accompanying notes 142–145. 
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to charges of hypocrisy given his prior support for the CLA.138 
Second, the Twenty-First Amendment precedent, which was 
based on the unique problems posed by “dry” state legislatures 
and their malapportionment, now assumed greater importance.139 
A plausible counterfactual exists in which the principal result 
that emerged from the Court fight (assuming that the switch-in-
time did not happen) was that all future amendments should be 
ratified by state conventions and that this was the preferred 
method for transforming the law.140 
Most important, the Vandenberg Amendment confirmed 
that the constitutional culture that framed Congress’s 
deliberations on the original CLA was gone. In 1924, state 
conventions were viewed as the way to slow down the Article 
Five bandwagon.141 Now they were seen as the only way to 
expedite ratification and salvage. The perspective on state 
legislatures, of course, flipped around the other way. Part of this 
was attributable to the CLA’s difficulties, but prior to 1937 most 
lawyers did not attach any significance to them. FDR succeeded 
in changing that through his campaign for Court-packing, and 
the Vandenberg Amendment consolidated that shift by 
accepting his assertion that the CLA was representative rather 
than exceptional. Constitutional law would never be the same. 
C. THE SWITCH-IN-TIME AND COLEMAN V. MILLER 
Two days after Senator Vandenberg opened his 
counterattack against the President’s position on the CLA, 
Justice Roberts changed his position on the New Deal in West 
Coast Hotel.142 Lawyers realized almost immediately that this 
meant that a statute banning child labor could now be 
sustained.143 Just a week after the switch, The New York Times 
 
 138. Granted, the textual differences between the Vandenberg Amendment and the 
original CLA might have provided the President with the excuse he needed to conduct 
his own switch-in-time if necessary. 
 139. See supra text accompanying notes 88–94. 
 140. This was not the only moment when the New Deal could have been thrown in a 
radically different direction. See Gerard N. Magliocca, Huey P. Long and the Guarantee 
Clause, 83 TULANE L. REV. 1 (2008) (explaining how Senator Long’s assassination in 
1935 aborted an effort to use the Guarantee Clause to articulate the principles of the 
emerging constitutional regime). 
 141. See supra text accompanying notes 47–56. 
 142. See West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379, 399–400 (1937) (upholding 
the Washington minimum wage statute and overruling Adkins v. Children’s Hospital). 
 143. In the days immediately preceding West Coast Hotel, there were some 
suggestions that a law challenging Hammer v. Dagenhart should be enacted as an 
alternative to the CLA. See End Child Labor, supra note 128, at 20 (“Even while the new 
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noted that “[e]vents of the last few days stimulated activity at 
both ends of Pennsylvania Avenue as well as in administrative 
circles generally on the problems of minimum wages and child 
labor.”144 Within a month, the bill that became the Fair Labor 
Standards Act was being drafted and interest in the CLA 
vanished as child labor was abolished by statute.145 
The Court finally got involved in the CLA debate in 1939, 
but the opinions in Coleman obscured the significance of the 
ratification debate.146 Chief Justice Hughes’ majority opinion 
held, among other things, that only Congress could place a time 
limit on the ratification of a constitutional amendment and that 
there was no indication that such a limit was contemplated for 
the CLA.147 But the Justices said nothing about the difficulty of 
getting an amendment ratified by the States and treated the 
amendment process as if it were unaffected by the Court-
packing fight. Indeed, Justice Robert H. Jackson later said that 
Coleman was important because if it had come out the other way 
“the precedent thus created would have placed serious 
restrictions upon the amending process for all time to come.”148 
The elected branches, however, established the real restrictions 
on Article Five in 1937 by persuading the country that state 
 
amendment is pending, they may find it possible, in the words of the President, to take 
action—now! This is the purpose of the bill just introduced by Senator WHEELER 
which . . . would make the products of child labor subject to the laws of the State into 
which they are shipped.”); id. (“What opponents of child labor need to keep principally 
in mind is that they are not necessarily confronted by an ‘either-or’ course.”).  
 144. Stark, supra note 134, at 70. 
 145. See The President’s Position, N.Y. TIMES, May 16, 1937, at 66 (“[R]ecent 
decisions of the Supreme Court offer reasonable hope that the problem of child labor can 
be dealt with satisfactorily without either an amendment of the Constitution or a forced 
change in the membership of the court itself.”); see also The Wheeler-Johnson Bill, N.Y. 
TIMES, May 6, 1937, at 24 (“A child labor amendment is itself still desirable. But it does 
not seem wise to reject three-quarters of a loaf now on the ground that it may injure 
one’s chances of getting a whole loaf perhaps several years hence.”). No states ratified 
the CLA after the switch-in-time. 
 146. Coleman v. Miller, 307 U.S. 433, passim (1939). The Court did mention that the 
President issued a letter in support of the CLA, but that was the only comment on the 
events described in the text. See id. at 451 n.28. 
 147. See id. at 451–54. The constitutionality of the FLSA was unclear at this point, 
thus a ruling that the CLA was no longer valid would have looked ominous. See 
ACKERMAN, supra note 3, at 262 (“Congress had acted as if it were confident that the 
Court would no longer defend cases like Hammer and would allow statutory action 
without the need for further constitutional amendment. But if the Court had upheld the 
Kansans’ complaint, it would be placing this assumption, and hence the Fair Labor 
Standards Act, under a cloud.”).  
 148. JACKSON, supra note 59, at 261. 
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legislatures were the place where constitutional amendments go 
to die.149 
CONCLUSION 
Textual changes to the Constitution did not end with the 
defeat of the Child Labor Amendment.150 What did end was the 
premise that getting these proposals ratified by state legislatures 
would be easy.151 The President’s plan to make the CLA into the 
poster child for the amendment process was successful even 
though its object—supporting Court-packing—was not. The 
failure of the ERA in the 1970s reinforced this notion and 
turned the futility of state ratification into a truism, to the point 
that today nobody is seriously pursuing constitutional change 
through Article Five. 
By showing that the current construction of Article Five is 
just that—a construction rather than a fact—this Article seeks to 
provoke a new discussion about the merits of using the 
constitutional amendment process. While there are circum-
stances where agreeing on a textual formula for legal change or 
moving that language through Congress may not be the best 
course of action, the assumption that federalism is an 
insurmountable obstacle to reform should be reexamined. 
 
 149. Justice Jackson also accepted this argument. See id. (“The difficulty of 
amending the Constitution to make sure that it says what it already was intended to say 
was illustrated by the fate of the proposed amendment.”). 
 150. The Twenty-Second Amendment took four years to ratify, which was the 
longest period for any successful proposal at that time. See KYVIG, supra note 7, at 327–
31 (discussing the amendment’s passage by Congress); see also AMAR, supra note 21, at 
433 (stating that ratification occurred in 1951); supra text accompanying note 24 (stating 
that the Sixteenth Amendment took almost as long to ratify). By contrast, the four 
amendments ratified in the 1960s and 1970s were rapidly adopted by the States. See 
KYVIG, supra note 7, at 355–56 (stating that the Twenty-Third Amendment was ratified 
in less than ten months); see also AMAR, supra note 21, at 442 (stating that the Twenty-
Fourth Amendment was ratified in two years); id. at 445 (stating that the Twenty-Sixth 
Amendment was ratified in just four months); id. at 449 (stating that the Twenty-Fifth 
Amendment was ratified in less than two years). 
 151. The proposed constitutional amendment to permit Congress to ban flag burning 
might constitute an exception, in the sense that one could say that the states would ratify 
such a proposal in no time flat if they were given the chance. There is no way to know, 
though, unless that amendment receives the necessary support in the Senate and in the 
House of Representatives. 
